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Resuscitating the American Dream
MITCHELL F. CRUSTOt
ABSTRACT
Fairness is a fundamental principle of American culture. Is it also
a constitutional principle to redress economic oppression? Simply, does
the U.S. Constitution protect its citizens from predatory lending prac-
tices? Will President Obama's call for empathy in constitutional juris-
prudence protect America's middle and under-privileged classes from
class discrimination?
This Article challenges the fairness of subjecting certain borrowers
to overreaching, economically-oppressive lending practices. This semi-
nal approach to the issue of predatory lending explores how established
constitutional principles might protect and redress past, present, and
future predatory lending victims, often socially and economically disad-
vantaged citizens. It seeks to define a novel constitutional theory, herein-
after entitled "moral capitalism," guaranteeing freedom from economic
oppression and ensuring financial fair dealing. It concludes that class is
the civil-rights' issue of the twenty-first century.
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Nor is the question before us whether the market is a force for
good or ill. Its power to generate wealth and expand freedom is
unmatched, but this crisis has reminded us that without a watchful
eye, the market can spin out of control- and that a nation cannot pros-
per long when it favors only the prosperous. The success of our econ-
omy has always depended not just on the size of our Gross Domestic
Product, but on the reach of our prosperity; on the ability to extend
opportunity to every willing heart - not out of charity, but because it
is the surest route to our common good.*
I. DOES THE U.S. CONSTITUTION PROTECT ITS CITIZENS FROM
ECONOMIC OPPRESSION?: MORAL CAPITALISM, EMPATHY,
AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. What Is Moral Capitalism?
1. RESUSCITATING THE AMERICAN DREAM
During the 2008 Presidential elections, an overwhelming majority
of Americans responded affirmatively to then candidate and Senator,
and now President, Barack Obama's message of change.1 Attempting to
negatively define Obama's change, then Senator and presidential candi-
date John McCain used the "s" word, labeling Obama a quasi-socialist.2
The United States is now facing an unprecedented challenge to our
capitalism, the greatest since the Great Depression.3 Clearly, there are
* Barack Obama, President, United States, "Obama's Inaugural Address" (Jan. 20, 2009),
available at http://obamaspeeches.com/P-Obama-Inaugural-Speech-Inauguration.htm (last visited
July 2, 2009).
1. See New York Times, Election Results 2008, http://elections.nytimes.com2008/results/
president/votes.html (last visited September 10, 2009) (showing President Obama received 365
electoral votes compared to 173 for Senator John McCain).
2. See Elizabeth Bumiller, McCain Embraces a G.O.P. Theme: No More Taxes, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2008, at A27.
3. See, e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF
2008 (2008) (describing how laissez-faire governing principles led to the worst financial crisis
since the 1930s, and what policies are needed to respond).
1012 [Vol. 63: 1011
OBAMA 'S MORAL CAPITALISM
many ways to reform our capitalism without resorting to socialism. Over
the next several years, the Obama Administration will face the challenge
of restructuring our nation's financial regulatory system, following the
greatest demise of our financial systems and in the midst of billions in
government bailout dollars for wealthy investment bankers.4 What
change will President Obama represent, and what role might the U.S.
Constitution play in that change?
Capitalism is the triumph of markets over individuals.' Significant
intellectual capital has rightfully been spent on the benefits of capital-
ism.6 On the other hand, there are recent critiques on the excesses or
abuses of capitalism.7 These are particularly relevant as the Nation faces
the greatest housing crisis in its history.8 Academic focus on capitalism
issues, as evidenced in business-law casebooks, inadvertently ignores
the rights of the Middle Class and the Under-Privileged. (The author
capitalizes both the words Middle Class and Under-Privileged as a mat-
ter of emphasis.) Middle Class and Under-Privileged law is also curi-
ously absent from legal restatement and codification efforts9 and from
state statutory development, reflecting the fact that the rights of the eco-
nomic Middle Class and Under-Privileged are solely ignored. 10 Despite
the absence in many corners of the law, the Middle Class and Under-
Privileged and the legal complexities they face have recently gained the
attention of some scholars."
2. ECONOMIC OPPRESSION: WAR ON THE MIDDLE CLASS AND ON
THE UNDER-PRIVILEGED
Following the election of President Lyndon B. Johnson in the
4. See David Barstow, Treasury's Oversight of Bailout Is Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2008,
at B3.
5. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., Modem
Library 1994) (1776) (characterizing economic developments in Europe).
6. See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST
AND MONEY (Mgmt. Laboratory Press 2009) (1936); DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY AND TAXATION (Cosimo Classics 2006) (1817); SMITH, supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., JAMES K. GALBRAITH, THE PREDATORY STATE: How CONSERVATIVES
ABANDONED THE FREE MARKET AND WHY LIBERALS SHOULD Too (2008) (attempting to purge the
liberal mind of the false economic idols of monetary control, balanced budgets and decreased
governmental regulations).
8. See Sally Pittman, Comment, ARMS, but No Legs To Stand On: "Subprime" Solutions
Plague the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1089, 1101 (2008).
9. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES (2000); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981).
10. Terms and connectors searches for "middle class" and "under-privileged" in the State
Statutes database (ST-ANN-ALL) on Westlaw show no state statutes expressly relating to these
two groups.
II. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Access to Justice: Some Comments, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 927 (2004).
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1960s, there was a call for a "war on poverty."' 2 This Article calls for
President Obama to develop constitutional principles to redress the con-
scious and unconscious "war on the Middle Class" 13 and on the Under-
Privileged. 4 The victims of this so-called war on the Middle Class and
the Under-Privileged include members of the military,' 5 students,' 6 chil-
dren,' 7 and socially and economically disadvantaged citizens,' 8 at the
very least.
This Article explores the appalling reality that under the U.S. Con-
stitution no American, regardless of class, gender, race, ethnicity, relig-
ion, marital status, or other distinguishing feature, is protected against
economic' 9 oppression"' or what will hereinafter be referred to as "pre-
dation."2 " This Article will explore one form of predation, that of preda-
tory22 lending,23 specifically that of "subprime mortgages. 24 Predation
12. See generally Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian
Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964) (discussing President Johnson's war on poverty).
13. See generally Lou DOBBS, WAR ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2006) (arguing big business and
government are undermining the Middle Class).
14. Cf Mitchell F. Crusto, Unconscious Classism: Entity Equality for Sole Proprietors, 10 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 215 (2009) [hereinafter Crusto, Unconscious Classism] (seeking to expand
constitutional principles to redress entity inequality between sole proprietors and other business
owners); Mitchell F. Crusto, Enslaved Constitution: Obstructing Freedom to Travel, 70 U. PiTrs.
L. REV. 233 (2008) [hereinafter Crusto, Enslaved Constitution] (arguing the inherent
constitutional right to intra-state travel as an expression of our Nation's freedom over its
enslavement paradigm).
15. See Dawn Goulet, Note, Protecting Our Protectors: The Defense Department's New
Rules To Prevent Predatory Lending to Military Personnel, 20 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 81
(2007).
16. See Bob Herbert, Editorial, Stepping on the Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2007, at A25.
17. See Editorial, Mission Unaccomplished, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2006, at A26.
18. See Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a Community-
Based Welfare System, 66 U. PrI. L. REv. 721, 742 n.89 (2005).
19. "Economic" is defined in pertinent part as "of or relating to the science of economics" or
"of, relating to, or concerned with the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED
720 [hereinafter WEBSTER'S] (1986).
20. "Oppression" is defined in pertinent part as "unjust or cruel exercise of authority or power
esp[ecially] by the imposition of burdens." WEBSTER'S, supra note 19 at 1584. This Article
defines "economic oppression" as the legal ability of one party ("oppressor") to take advantage of
another ("prey") and in doing so to cause injury to the prey to the benefit of the oppressor. It
includes all forms of overreaching and leverage of power that results in the inability of the prey to
enjoy a meaningful, stress free economic life for themselves and their families.
21. "Predation" is defined in pertinent part as "the act of preying or plundering: depravation,
despoilment, rapacity." WEBSTER'S, supra note 19 at 1785.
22. "Predatory" is defined in pertinent part as "disposed or showing a disposition to injury or
exploit others for one's own gain." WEBSTER'S, supra note 19 at 1785.
23. This Article defines "predatory lending" as the legal yet unethical lending to marginalized
people under lending terms that they cannot afford.
24. The term "subprime lending," for purposes of this Article, refers to "engaging in
deception or fraud, manipulating the borrower through aggressive sales tactics, or taking unfair
advantage of a borrower's lack of understanding about loan terms ... often combined with loan
1014
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will be analyzed in light of the current challenges facing American
capitalism.
3. THE DEMISE OF SUPERCAPITALISM
In the 1987 movie, Wall Street, the protagonist, Gordon Gekko
made a profound statement about the ethics or morality of American
capitalism when he proclaimed, "Greed is good."25 And yet we have
clear signs that unregulated capitalism, or "supercapitalism," 26 is not
good. In fact, recent financial conditions demonstrate that unregulated
supercapitalism is destructive both to our national economy and our citi-
zens.2 7 Can the U.S. Constitution serve as a counterbalance to super-
capitalism? Is class the new civil-rights' issue? Should the Constitution
protect a citizen's right to fair economic treatment regardless of his or
her economic status as Middle Class or Under-Privileged? And what
role might the Obama Administration play in developing such constitu-
tional principles?
4. OBAMA'S MORAL CAPITALISM DEFINED
What, then, is Obama's "moral capitalism"?28 It is a constitution-
ally-based approach to protecting citizens against economic discrimina-
tion on the basis of class. Moral capitalism is hereinafter defined as "the
constitutional principle of regulating capitalism to protect citizens from
predation and to redress economic exploitation due to one's class or eco-
nomic condition."
B. Economic Oppression through the Lens of
Empathy and the Constitution
1. ECONOMIC OPPRESSION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL-RIGHTS' ISSUE
What role would moral capitalism play in protecting U.S. citizens
terms that, alone or in combination, are abusive or make the borrower more vulnerable to abusive
practices." Robert G. Schwemm & Michael Allen, For the Rest of Their Lives: Seniors and the
Fair Housing Act, 90 IOWA L. REv. 121, 211 n.463 (2004).
25. WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987); Internet Movie Data Base, Memorable Quotes
for Wall Street, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt009429llquotes (last visited May 28, 2009).
26. See generally ROBERT B. REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM (2007) (arguing people's power has
shifted from democratic power to consumerism-driven power).
27. See, e.g., KRUGMAN, supra note 3 (describing how laissez-faire governing principles led
to the worst financial crisis since the 1930s, and what policies are needed to respond).
28. The term "moral capitalism" is coined by the author for purposes of this Article.
Following a current search, the author has found no particular references in President Obama's
policies specifically coined moral capitalism. Cf MICHAEL KINSLEY ET AL., CREATIVE
CAPITALISM: A CONVERSATION WTH BILL GATES, WARREN BUFFET, AND OTHER ECONOMIC
LEADERS (2008) (debating the pros and cons of big corporations integrating good works into their
business models).
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from economic oppression? Take the case of subprime predatory mort-
gage lending, wherein the least financially capable are required to pay a
higher interest rate for a mortgage.29 Should protection against predatory
lending be a constitutional-rights' issue?
There is no doubt that the foreclosure crisis has resulted from sub-
prime predatory mortgage lending, by which hundreds of thousands of
American citizens were provided allegedly unsuitable mortgage loans.3"
In 2007, "278 subprime-mortgage-related cases were filed in federal
court," "that figure is likely to continue growing," and "[florty-three per-
cent of those cases were borrower class actions, most involving inade-
quate disclosure regarding option (sic) adjustable-rate mortgages
(ARMs) and discriminatory lending practices."31
The question then is on what basis can the law redress the victims
or "prey"32 of subprime predatory mortgage lending? Clearly, redress is
available in instances of fraud,33 but proof of fraud places a tremendous
litigation burden on the prey against the predatory lenders.34 All levels
of government, including the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches, at the federal, the state,35 and the local levels, have failed to
develop an effective criteria short of fraud to redress subprime, preda-
tory mortgage practices.36
29. See PAUL MUOLO & MZYHER PADILLA, CHAINS OF BLAME: How WALL STREET CAUSED
THE MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS (2008) (leading readers down the subprime money trail and
through the quagmire of what went wrong inside the nation's subprime-lending firms that led to
the mortgage and credit crisis).
30. PATRICK MADIGAN, OVERVIEW OF THE SUBPRIME FORECLOSURE CRISIS (2007), available
at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file-id= 13463&
rtcontentdisposition=filename%3DMadigan%20-%2OSubprime%20Foreclosures%20-
%20Statement%20of%20the%2OCase.pdf; National State Attorneys General Program at
Columbia Law School, "Home Foreclosures and Predatory Lending," http://www.law.columbia.
edu/center..program/ag/predatorylend (last visited May 28, 2009).
31. Allison Torres Burtka, Predatory-Lending Litigation Looms, TRIAL, May 2008, at 16,
available at http://staging.justice.org/Publications/trial/0805/news01.aspx (last visited July 20,
2009).
32. This Article defines "prey" as at-risk borrowers who for various reasons are subject to
greater likelihood of default on their payments. The term "risky borrower" has commonly been
used by lenders, denoting some likely culpability on the borrower's part. The term "prey" is meant
to emphasize the plight of the borrower rather than the potential loss to the lender. See, supra note
20 for a prior, brief introduction of the term "prey."
33. E.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185,
2248 (2007).
34. Cf Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information-A Breach in
Search of Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 120 (1998) ("[Ilt is easier to prove the facts of an
insider trading case than to prove facts demonstrating that an issuer committed fraud .... ").
35. See, e.g., Nanette Byrnes, These Tough Lending Laws Could Travel, North Carolina's
Progressive Protection Laws for Borrowers Pay Become a Nationwide Model, Bus. WK., Nov.5,
2007, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_45b4O57078.htm?chan=search.
36. See, e.g., Julie R. Caggiano et al., Subprime Mortgage and Predatory Lending Law
Developments, 63 Bus. LAW. 625 (2008) (surveying new state and federal regulation and
1016 [Vol. 63:1011
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Over the last several years, the law has been grappling with
whether it should redress the abuses of the subprime, predatory mort-
gage crisis and if so how. "Predatory lending has become one of the
most critical policy issues facing the financial services industry, particu-
larly mortgage lending .... Despite a broad consensus to take action,
efforts to end predatory lending have been modest at best."3 7
2. EMPATHY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
President Obama has introduced a new concept into constitutional
jurisprudence, that of "empathy."38 In his book, The Audacity of Hope,
then-Senator Obama wrote:
That last sense of . . . character-a sense of empathy-is one that I
find.., at the heart of my moral code, and it is how I understand the
Golden Rule-not simply as a call to sympathy or charity, but as
something more demanding, a call to stand in someone else's shoes
and see through their eyes.39
Perhaps some Obama critics believed his empathy concept was mere
political rhetoric. To the contrary, during the early months of his presi-
dency, President Obama resurrected the empathy concept to apply to his
judicial policy as an expressed criteria for judicial selection to the
Supreme Court. When Justice David Souter announced his retirement
plans, President Obama stated that the Court needs "empathy, of under-
standing and identifying with people's hopes and struggles as an essen-
tial ingredient for arriving at just decisions and outcomes."4° In naming
a replacement to the Supreme Court, President Obama stated he was
seeking in a candidate for the Supreme Court "someone who under-
stands that justice isn't about some abstract legal theory or footnote in a
case book."4 1 "It is also about how our laws affect the daily realities of
people's lives-whether they can make a living and care for their fami-
lies, whether they feel safe in their homes and welcome in their own
legislation impacting the mortgage industry); Stephen F.J. Ornstein et al., Update on FederalAnti-
Predatory Lending Legislative Efforts, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 620 (2007) (describing and
analyzing how the federal legislative efforts to curb predatory mortgage lending will make the
credit availability problems significantly worse and longer-lasting).
37. JAMES H. CARR & LOPA KOLLURI, FANNIE MAE FOUND., PREDATORY LENDING: AN
OVERVIEW 1 (2001), available at http://www.knowledgeplex.org/kp/text-document-summary/
article/relfiles/hotjtopics/Carr-Kolluri.pdf.
38. See Peter Slevin, Obama Makes Empathy a Requirement for Court, WASH. POST, May 13,
2009, at A3.
39. BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN
DREAM 66 (2006).
40. The White House- Blog Post- The President's Remarks on Justice David Souter, May 1,
2009, available at http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Remarks-by-The-President-On-Justice-
David-Souter/ (last visited September 10, 2009).
41. Id.
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nation."42 By focusing on economic infrastructure, class division, and
institutional inequities, this Article seeks to use Critical Class theory to
explore a constitutional-rights' basis for redressing economic
exploitation.
3. UNCONSCIOUS INSTITUTIONAL CLASSISM AND EMPATHY
With the election of the first African-American President, some
constitutional commentators believe that as a constitutional imperative,
race is now pass6, 43 and perhaps the same can be said about gender for
other reasons.44 Neither are race nor gender truly pass6, but both race
and gender analysis have masked the extremely significant underlying
issue of class discrimination. As a stand-alone issue, class discrimination
ala economic oppression is clearly a critical, constitutional issue, essen-
tial to the exercise of personal liberty and freedom, and fundamental to
other constitutional, human-rights' issues, including slavery, 45 racial ine-
quality,46 and sexual inequality,47 to name a few.
This Article concentrates on a constitutional basis to redress sub-
prime mortgage predatory lending practices. In addition, shedding light
on predatory lending illuminates many other important, tangential areas
of constitutional inquiry and further validates economic oppression's
42. Id. In nominating Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court, President
Obama stated, "It is experience that can give a person a common touch and a sense of
compassion; an understanding of how the world works and how ordinary people live. And that is
why it is a necessary ingredient in the kind of justice we need on the Supreme Court." Remarks by
the President in Nominating Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Remarks-by-the-President-in-
Nominating-Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor-to-the-United-States-Supreme-Court (last visited June 6,
2009).
43. Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky & Kimberly C. Kisabeth, Tracing the Steps in a Historic
Election, 85 DENY. U. L. REV. 615, 615-16 (2009); see also Sharon L. Browne & Elizabeth A. Yi,
The Spirit of Brown in Parents Involved and Beyond, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 657, 676 n. 149 (2009)
(discussing today's race-relations debates).
44. But see Gregory S. Parks & Jefferey J. Rachlinski, A Better Metric: The Role of
Unconscious Race and Gender Bias in the 2008 Presidential Election (Cornell Legal Studies
Research Working Paper, Paper No. 08-007, 2008).
45. See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 981 (2004).
46. See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMAN, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME, THE
REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR 11 (2009). See
also AURIANA OJEDA, SLAVERY TODAY (2004) (series of essays on slavery and labor issues);
National Underground Railroad Freedom Center, "Slavery Today," available at http:/
www.freedomcenter.org/slavery-today/ (last visited July 18, 2009); John 0. Calmore, A Call to
Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and
Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1927, 1942-43 (1999).
47. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Right Claims
Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994) (discussing
women's property claims in the mid-nineteenth century).
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quintessential importance. These include criminal,48 governmental bene-
fits,4 9 disparate education,5" and comparative welfare5 issues. Conse-
quently, this Article is dedicated to exploring the law's treatment of the
constitutional dimension of protection against economic exploitation in
the form of predatory lending.
Why doesn't the law treat home mortgage borrowers the same as it
treats securities (such as stock) investors, in light of the fact that home
mortgages are often sold as investments? Does subprime lending law
disparately impact borrowers who often reside at the bottom rung of the
socioeconomic ladder? What does an analysis of subprime mortgage
lending unveil about the true meaning and rise of American capitalism?
The answers to these questions are viewed from the sub-lens of Critical
Class Theory, which is referred to hereinafter as "critical institutional
classism."
Before outlining the direction of this Article, it is essential to pre-
sent a perspective or lens through which class-rights' law will be
viewed. What is "critical institutional classism" or "CIC"?52 Essentially,
for purposes of this Article, CIC is the study of institutional classism,
the phenomenon by which financial institutions, such as banks, mort-
gage lenders, credit-card companies, payday-loan companies, student-
loan lenders, car-loan companies, and the like, consciously or uncon-
sciously, take economic advantage of prey. One interesting aspect of
critical institutional classism is that the same albeit legal predatory insti-
tutional behavior would clearly be illegal or at least unethical were it
between one individual and another individual. Somehow, when institu-
tions are the beneficial party to a transaction, the rules of ethics seem to
go out the window. In other words, when it comes to institutional behav-
ior, greed is good and legally acceptable.
This Article then addresses both conscious as well as unconscious
institutional classism. Is there a place in constitutional theory to address
both conscious and unconscious institutional classism? Beyond analyz-
ing and remedying overt acts of inequity, constitutional-rights' theorists
48. See Carolyn Wolpert, Considering Race and Crime: Distilling Non-Partisan Policy from
Opposing Theories, 36 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 265, 277-78 (1999).
49. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 518-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market: The Political Economy of Non-
Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights Movement, 54 U. MiAMi L. REV.
247, 268-69 (2000).
50. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-71 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
51. See Jane Maslow Cohen, Equality for Girls and Other Women: The Built Architecture of
the Purposive Life, 9 J. CONEMP. LEGAL IssUEs 103, 134-35 (1998).
52. See generally Crusto, Unconscious Classism, supra note 14 (presenting the analytical
concepts of critical institutional classism and critical class theory for the first time).
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have come to recognize the need to expand constitutional-rights' theory
beyond overt acts to redress unconscious and institutional forms of
rights violations. 3 This Article seeks to contribute to the Critical Class
Theory of constitutional-rights' theory by presenting, in part, a frame-
work for analyzing social and economic discrepancies by focusing on
the economic infrastructure, class divisions, and institutionalized inequi-
ties manifest within the United States.
CIC continues the work started by Critical Race Theory (CRT),54
Critical Feminist Theory (CFT), 55 and Critical Class Theory (CCT),5 6
53. See, e.g., Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman, Seeing the Old Lady: A New Perspective on the Age
Old Problems of Discrimination, Inequality, and Subordination, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 263
(2007) (arguing that current laws only address blatant racism and should be further refined); Ian F.
Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59
STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007) (discussing the history of colorblindness in the context of
antidiscrimination law); Adam Winkler, The Federal Government as a Constitutional Niche in
Affirmative Action Cases, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1931 (2007) (arguing that federal courts treat federal
affirmative action laws more leniently than they do state laws); cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (invalidating racial classifications in student-
assignment plans); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding a public law school's use
of race in admissions decisions to maintain a diverse student body).
54. See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995);
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw
et al. eds., 1995); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race:
Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1999)
(arguing that anti-racist scholars generally misunderstand the relationship between racial and other
forms of oppression, and thus help perpetuate heterosexism); Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1455 (2002) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?] (criticizing "progressive race
blindness" theory for failing to embrace race as an important dimension of identity); Athena D.
Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related
Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REv. 329 (2006) (suggesting that CRT should more adequately
account for issues of class); Bailey Figler, Note, A Vote for Democracy: Confronting the Racial
Aspects of Felon Disenfranchisement, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 723 (2006) (discussing the
problem of unconscious racism in felon disenfranchisement).
55. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Does Nothing Ever Change; Is Everything New?: Comments on the
"To Do Feminist Legal Theory" Symposium, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 415 (2003) (summarizing
various works of CFT scholarship); Don S. Browning, Linda McClain's The Place of Families
and Contemporary Family Law: A Critique from Critical Familism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1383 (2007)
(proposing a theory of "critical familism" to challenge trends in family law theory); Vema L.
Williams, Private Choices, Public Consequences: Public Education Reform and Feminist Legal
Theory, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 563 (2006) (discussing public education from a CFT
perspective).
56. See, e.g., EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE,
GENDER, IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS (2005); MARTHA R. MAHONEY ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE:
PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW (2003); Clark Freshman, Foreword: Revisioning the
Constellations of Critical Race Theory, Law and Economics, and Empirical Scholarship, 55
STAN. L. REV. 2267 (2003) (book review) (suggesting an overlap between CRT and empirical
studies of inequality); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination,
56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005) (discussing discrimination in employment decisions); Kristin
Brandser Kalsem, Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Well-Being of Women: How
Intersectionality Matters in Money Matters, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 1181 (2006) (arguing that
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and in many ways is consistent with these theories. CRT calls for legal
discourse intending to uphold the rights of those who are disadvantaged
because of their race.57 Similarly, CFT focuses on the social impact of
gender discrimination.58 However, these calls for legal discourse on race
and gender equality have not reached their full potential because the
economic element of how or why there is racial and gender discrimina-
tion often is not addressed.59 CCT hopes that by focusing on the eco-
nomic aspect of discrimination, one might understand that various forms
of discrimination are by-products of class-based discrimination.6" CCT
assesses political and economic factors, in addition to social factors. One
hopes that through the prism of CCT, various aspects of unconscious
and institutionalized inequities will be redressed, as sometimes inequi-
ties result from the mentality of individuals and the socioeconomic
impact of their prejudices.6" Through the tri-focal lens of CIC, combin-
ing CCT, CRT, and CFT, including recent theories of unconscious
adverse behavior, and Obama's concept of empathy, this Article ana-
lyzes economic oppression and predatory lending law as outlined next.
C. The Thesis and Overview of the Article
Through the lens of CIC and Obama's concept of empathy, this
Article argues that constitutional law should be reformed to recognize
citizens' rights against economic oppression. In a manner consistent
with the fiduciary-duty analysis used to protect minority shareholders in
corporate law and the fairness/suitability principles found in investment/
brokerage law to protect investors from unsuitable investments, this
Article seeks to promote fairness in economic transactions and seeks to
protect citizens from economic oppression, such as predatory lending
feminist legal theory requires broader thinking about matters relating to women's financial well-
being); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact
Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1996) (discussing disparate
impact and class theory in the employment context); Rachel Bloomekatz, Comment, Rethinking
Immigration Status Discrimination and Exploitation in the Low-Wage Workplace, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1963 (2007) (analyzing the statutory remedies available for U.S. workers to challenge
employment discrimination in favor of immigrants).
57. See, e.g., Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?, supra note 54, at 1477 (noting that
critical race theorists and critical legal scholars agree that rights are socially constructed).
58. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 55, at 569 (discussing the workings of inner city public
schools and how educational reform policies appear to condemn poor parents, who are often
single women).
59. See, e.g., Mutua, supra note 54, at 391 (discussing the interrelation between class and race
in critical race theory).
60. Id. at 389.
61. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 56, at 744 (explaining that in some contexts discrimination may
be the result of individuals making subjective decisions).
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practices .62
Some critics will see this attempt to expand constitutional protec-
tion against class discrimination as a means to restrict or terminate a
market for borrowers who without subprime lending would not have the
ability to own a home.63 Some will see it as an assault against free mar-
ket principles. 6' Others will see it as the demise of capitalism and the
victory of socialism. Despite the anticipated criticism, expanding consti-
tutional rights to protect citizens against economic oppression is a wor-
thy exercise.
An overview of the Article is appropriate. Part I presents the con-
cept of moral capitalism as constitutionally-needed protection against
economic oppression or predation, critical institutional classism through
the lens of empathy, and an overview of this Article. Part II analyzes the
current subprime mortgage lending/foreclosure crisis, the current failure
to redress predation wrongs, and the need for constitutional reform. Part
III proposes a new constitutional principle, that of moral capitalism, as
the constitutional right against predation. Part IV makes the public pol-
icy and constitutional case for expanding constitutional-rights' theory to
the freedom of predation, arguing that current constitutional case law is
inadequate to remedy unconscious institutional classism, and that Sub-
stantive Due Process should ensure that fairness principles apply to pro-
tect citizens against predation.
Part V concludes that constitutional law should embrace class dis-
crimination as the new civil-rights' agenda for the twenty-first century.
This can be accomplished by recognizing the moral capitalism principle,
the right to protection against economic oppression including predation.
Such a constitutional development would realize President Obama' s call
for empathy in constitutional jurisprudence and would establish a pro-
tective human-rights' Constitution, protecting the rights of the least
empowered in our society, and institutionalize our custom and value of
fairness.
II. PREDATION AND THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
They're telling us we're better off if we dismantle government -
if we divvy it up into individual tax breaks, hand 'em out, and
encourage everyone to go buy your own health care, your own retire-
62. See discussion infra Part III.
63. See Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as
Laboratories of Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REv. 295, 304 (2005).
64. See C. Lincoln Combs, Comment, Banking Law and Regulation: Predatory Lending in
Arizona, 38 ARiz. ST. L.J. 617, 627-29 (2006).
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ment security, your own child care, their own schools, your own pri-
vate security force, your own roads, their own levees...
It's called the Ownership Society in Washington. But in our past
there has been another term for it - Social Darwinism - every man or
women for him or herself...
It has been the creation of a massive middle class, through
decent wages and benefits and public schools - that has allowed all of
us to prosper....
Yes, our greatness as a nation has depended on individual initia-
tive, on a belief in the free market. But it has also depended on our
sense of mutual regard for each other, of mutual responsibility. The
idea that everybody has a stake in the country, that we're all in it
together and everybody's got a shot at opportunity....
Our vision of America is . . .one that gives every American the
opportunity to make the most of their lives. It's not one that tells us
we're on our own, it's one that realizes that we rise or fall together as
one people.6 5
Part I analyzes how presently the law fails to redress unconscious
institutional classism in the form of subprime mortgage lending. It
presents a brief history of subprime mortgage lending, focuses on the
amorphous legal definition of predatory lending, and analyzes subprime
mortgage lending's relationship to predation. This Part establishes that
the law currently lacks consensus on what constitutes illegal predatory
lending and places too high a legal hurdle on lending prey who are seek-
ing to redress subprime predatory lending practices. It argues that using
a constitutionally-based rights' approach to redress predation is fair and
promotes justice, especially in light of unconscious institutional
classism.
A. Subprime Mortgage Lending: A Case of Predation
In the Batman movie, The Dark Knight, the sinister villain Two-
Face uses a two-faced coin to determine the fate of his victims: one side
meaning life, the other side death.6 6 Like many things in life, mortgage
lending has many faces, the good, the bad, and the ugly. The good face
of mortgage lending is access to capital markets and the joys of home-
ownership.6 7 The bad side of mortgage lending is the tremendous oppor-
65. Barack Obama's Speech at "AFSCME National Convention, Challenge for Labor," http:II
obamaspeeches.comIO86-AFSCME-National-Convention-Obama-Speech.htm (last visited June
28, 2009).
66. See Internet Movie Database, Memorable Quotes for the Dark Knight, http://www.imdb.
comltitle/tt0468569/quotes (last visited May 29, 2009) ("The world is cruel, and the only morality
in a cruel world is chance. [holds up his coin]: Unbiased. Unprejudiced. Fair.").
67. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending,
Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1311 (2006) ("Most
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tunity for abuse by subprime lenders through predatory lending
practices. 68 Then there is the ugly side, which is where such predatory
practices result in the foreclosure against the predatory prey, resulting in
the loss of homes, equity, and initial upfront investment.
69
In addition to mortgage lending, all types of consumer lending are
vital to both the U.S. 70 and world economies and, therefore, deserve seri-
ous scrutiny. Consumer lending is big business; in 2005 alone, Ameri-
cans bought $1.8 trillion worth of goods using credit cards.7' The
continued vitality of consumer lending and its contributions to the econ-
omy have received national attention.72
Looking closer at these statistics, one discovers two universes of
lending. One universe represents individuals who are prime lenders. The
other universe represents subprime borrowers. Many subprime borrow-
ers are often located in inner-city and rural communities. 73 They are usu-
ally less able to negotiate the terms of their loans, despite the availability
of fairer lending terms. 4 As a result, subprime borrowers often fail to
participate in one of the greatest features of economic life in America,
the ability to access capital markets under reasonable terms. This ability
is hereinafter referred to as "Fair Credit Equality." In addition, subprime
borrowers are subject to other economic pressures.7 This Article is not
about the interplay of these other economic pressures and subprime
lending, although that is a meritorious discussion. Rather, this Article
focuses on the fundamental unfairness of subprime lending.
What is predatory lending? Following the growth of the subprime
mortgage market over the last decade,76 there is the probing question: Is
subprime lenders provide a valuable service by giving borrowers access to credit to buy homes
68. See, e.g., id. at 1310-16.
69. See Azmy, supra note 63, at 343-45.
70. Steven Mercatante, The Deregulation of Usury Ceilings, Rise of Easy Credit, and
Increasing Consumer Debt, 53 S.D. L. REV. 37, 37 (2008).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Sudeep Reddy, Credit-Card Fees Curbed-Senate Approves Sweeping
Restrictions, House Passage Seen, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2009, at Al.
73. Cf Kenneth N. Klee, One Size Fits Some: Single Asset Real Estate Bankruptcy Cases, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1285, 1300-01 (2002) (discussing foreclosures in rural areas); Emily Jeffcott,
Comment, The Mortgage Reform and Anti Predatory Act of 2007: Paving a Secure Path for
Minorities in the Midst of the Sub Prime Debacle, 10 SCHOLAR 449, 450-55 (2008) (discussing
subprime lending to minorities). While a study of subprime lending might also raise issues of this
nature, such a study is beyond the scope of this Article.
74. Id.
75. See generally Cassandra Jones Harvard, Democratizing Credit: Examining the Structural
Inequities of Subprime Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 233 (2006) (discussing how subprime
mortgages further subordinate the poor).
76. See California Progressive Report, http://www.califomiaprogressreport.comI2007/03/
thesubprime-fo.html (last visited May 29, 2008) (reporting that in 1994, the mortgage industry
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subprime lending per se predatory? As previously mentioned, the legal
definition of predatory lending is not clear. In addition to the practice of
charging borrowers excessive interest and imposing unmanageable
financial terms, predatory lending may take many forms.77 In addition to
subprime mortgage lending, predatory lending flourishes in various
other areas of lending, including payday loans,78 overdraft loans, 79 car-
title loans,8 ° credit cards,8' refund-anticipation loans,82 and mandatory
arbitration.83
Of course, not all lending is predatory; there are many underlying
issues in the predatory lending debate: risk-based pricing, competition,
financial education, caveat emptor, and discrimination. Risk-based pric-
ing is "the practice of using a consumer's credit report, which reflects
his or her risk of nonpayment, in setting or adjusting the price and other
terms of credit offered or extended to a particular consumer."84 In other
words, lenders charge higher interest rates to borrowers more likely to
default on a loan. And lenders charge lower interest rates to borrowers
less likely to default on a loan. Defenders of risk-based pricing note that
charging everyone equal interest rates penalizes those persons capable
and likely to pay their loans by charging them for the default rates of
riskier borrowers.85 On the other hand, opponents argue that risk-based
pricing further impoverishes the poor while enriching the affluent.86
Indeed, when lenders charge low-income borrowers higher interest rates
and hefty fees, those lenders are ensuring that low-income borrower will
certainly fail to pay their loans.
issued thirty-five billion dollars in subprime loans, which was about one percent of the total
market; and, by 2006, subprime mortgage loans reached $665 billion or twenty-three percent of
the market).
77. See OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2, at 2-3 (Feb. 21, 2003), available at www.occ.treas.gov/
ftp/advisory/2003-2.pdf
78. See Goulet, supra note 15, at 86-88.
79. See Benjamin D. Faller, Note, Payday Loan Solutions: Slaying the Hydra (and Keeping It
Dead), 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 125, 155 (2008).
80. See Peterson, supra note 33, at 2223 n.214.
81. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1411-16 (2004).
82. See Goulet, supra note 15, at 84.
83. See Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to
Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 831, 853-54 (2002).
84. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Agencies Issue Proposed Rules on Risk-Based Pricing Notices (May 8, 2008), available at http:II
www.federalreserve.gov/newseventslpresslbcreg/20080508a.htm.
85. Cf Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1147-49 (1979) (defending the secured-creditor-versus-
unsecured-creditor distinction on the ability of borrowers to get lower interest rates in secured
transactions and arguing against equality among lenders).
86. Cf Harvard, supra note 75, at 235-36 (arguing that subprime lending further
economically subordinates the poor).
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In contrast to risk-based pricing critics, competition critics contend
that, while risk-based pricing does not create problems, lenders abuse
the risk-based-pricing methodology to overcharge borrowers.87 Financial
education, others argue, can solve the subprime problem. Theoretically,
perfectly informed consumers would make a loan only if they would
profit from it - that is, not default.88 Financial education proponents
argue that consumers should be better educated about financing. 9
Another debate concerns fiduciary duty as applied to mortgage lending.
That is, even where a lender makes no attempt to deceive the borrower,
should a lender have a higher duty to the borrower, such as a fiduciary/
stockbroker's duty when buying and selling securities to investors?
Lastly, others criticize financial institutions for engaging in racial dis-
crimination. These critics do not allege intentional discrimination but
systemic discrimination, reflecting the notion that minorities have a
lower socioeconomic status and feel a disparate impact from subprime
lending.90 In any case, the current state of the law appears inadequate to
address predation.
B. The Current State of the Law Fails to Redress Subprime
Mortgage Lending Predation Wrongs and Evidences the
Need for a Constitutionally-Based Remedy
The law's current views of predation are ripe for reform, especially
as predatory lending practices have become commonplace. 9' Unfortu-
nately, such practices often have the support of law and of government.
But that does not make them fair or constitutional. A brief analysis of
the current theories of subprime mortgage liability shows that current
theories do not result in justice for subprime lending prey. The following
survey is a brief, non-exhaustive study of predatory lending case law.
The author believes that this survey is sufficient evidence that, while
predation is a major concern, the law has failed to develop sufficient
mechanisms to protect citizens from it or to provide them redress as a
result of it.
First, there is a definitional problem. Perhaps what makes subprime
mortgage and predatory lending difficult to address "is the lack of con-
87. Id.
88. Barak D. Richman & Christopher Boerner, A Transaction Cost Economizing Approach to
Regulation: Understanding the NIMBY Problem and Improving Regulatory Responses, 23 YALE
J. ON REG. 29, 53 (2006).
89. See, e.g., Kimberly M. Gartner & Elizabeth R. Schiltz, What's Your Score? Educating
College Students About Credit Card Debt, 24 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 401 (2005).
90. Id.
91. See Laura Dietrich, Note, Massachusetts' New Predatory Lending Law and the
Expanding Rift Between Federal and State Lending, 26 B. C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 169, 170 (2006)
(noting that predatory lending has cost American homeowners nearly $9.1 billion a year).
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sensus on what constitutes illegal predatory lending."92 In 2000, the
Department of Housing and the Treasury published a report organizing
predatory lending practices into four groups: loan flipping,93 imposition
of excessive fees and "packing,"94 lending without regard to the ability
to pay,95 and fraud.96
Second, there are not many cases finding lenders liable for preda-
tory lending practices. Yet there are some developing theories of lender
liability, the most prominent of which is "reverse redlining." Reverse
redlining occurs when lenders target residents residing in certain geo-
graphic boundaries and grant those targeted residents unfair loan
terms.9 7 As an example, a New Jersey court, in Associates Homes Equity
Services v. Troup, held that reverse redlining violated not only the Fair
Housing Act but also the Civil Rights Act and New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination.98 In holding that reverse redlining violated the
Civil Rights Act and the Law Against Discrimination, the court relied on
the allegation that the lenders mistreated African Americans via reverse
redlining.99 The disparate impact of reverse redlining sufficed - inten-
tional discrimination need not exist. 100
Similarly, in Munoz v. International Home Capital Corp., the U.S.
District Court for Northern California found that reverse redlining vio-
lated the Fair Housing Act.101 The court enumerated four elements to
create a prima facie case of reverse redlining. First, the homeowner must
fit into a suspect class. Next, the homeowner must have applied and
qualified for a loan. Then, the loan must have grossly unfavorable
terms.'° 2 Lastly, the lender must provide better loans to others who are
similarly qualified. 103 Despite the fact that the Munoz plaintiffs did not
allege the last element, the court refused to dismiss their complaint, for
the plaintiffs could show that element through discovery. 104 Other courts
92. CARR & KOLLURI, supra note 37, at 1.
93. HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 2




97. Id. at 185.
98. 778 A.2d 529, 537 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); accord Hargraves v. Capital City
Mortgage Co., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting reverse redlining violated Fair
Housing Act and Civil Rights Act). Other states have also held reverse redlining to violate state
law. See McGlawn v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 891 A.2d 757, 762 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).
99. See Associates Homes, supra note 98, at 536.
100. Id. at 537.
101. No. C 03-01099 RS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26362, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2004).
102. Id. at *12.
103. Id. at *13.
104. Id.
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have agreed with the Munoz analysis.10 5
Despite these courts' recognition that reverse redlining violates the
law, Associates Homes has the farthest reach. For the court in Associates
Homes not only noted that reverse redlining violated the law but also
held that a borrower could use reverse redlining as an affirmative
defense against foreclosure. 106 Thus, even if the statute of limitation runs
on a claim against reverse redlining, a homeowner can impede foreclo-
sure through an affirmative defense. 0 7 Not every court has agreed that
reverse redlining constitutes a violation of the Fair Housing Act. In Wilt-
shire v. Dhanraj,°8 the federal district court refused to find a violation
of the Fair Housing Act, despite allegations of reverse redlining.' 0 9
Notably, the court underscored the lack of any allegation mentioning
disparate impact. ' 0
In addition to reverse redlining jurisprudence, there has been state
statutory development to redress predatory mortgage lending. For exam-
ple, in 1999, North Carolina adopted its Predatory Lending Law.111 Over
the following decade, nearly thirty states have followed North Carolina's
lead and adopted similar laws." 2 Some states have specifically created
new laws to forestall foreclosures. For example, in Massachusetts,. the
Attorney General used the Massachusetts's Predatory Home Loan Prac-
tice Act to enjoin one lender from foreclosing against certain homeown-
ers.113 A lower court found that the Massachusetts Attorney General
would likely prevail in showing four factors that, when combined, con-
stituted a violation of the Predatory Home Loan Practice Act:114 The
adjusted-rate-mortgage loans had an introductory period under three
years; the introductory rate increased by more than three points when it
reached its fully indexed value; the borrowers' debt-to-income ratio
exceeded fifty percent if one calculated using the fully indexed rate; and
the loan-to-value ratio was 100%.115 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts upheld the lower court's preliminary injunction, which
prevented the lender from foreclosing on borrowers' homes. 116 Interest-
105. See, e.g., Matthews v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 886 (S.D.
Ohio 2002) (applying the same four elements as the Munoz court and refusing to dismiss claim).
106. Associates Homes, supra note 98, at 538-49.
107. See id. at 539-40.
108. 421 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
109. Id. at 553.
110. Id. at 553 n.7.
111. Dietrich, supra note 91, at 185.
112. Id.
113. See Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 550-51 (Mass. 2008).
114. Id. at 554.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 562.
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ingly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the prelimi-
nary injunction despite the fact that the Predatory Home Loan Practice
Act only prohibited high-cost-home mortgages'" and the fact that the
loan in the case did not constitute a high-cost-home mortgage." 8 The
court looked beyond formalities and focused on the spirit of the law.
Though practicing in a different context, the lender evinced the same
fundamental unfairness outlawed by the Massachusetts law. Therefore,
the courts could enjoin the lender's actions." 9 Perhaps this is an exam-
ple of what President Obama refers to as empathy in judicial decisions.
One other court mimicked the Massachusetts court's spirit-of-the-
law, empathy-based analysis. In Herrod v. First Republic Mortgage
Corp., the borrowers alleged that the lender charged them ludicrous fees
and alleged unconscionability. 20 The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals noted that the West Virginia Predatory Lending Law had not
taken effect when the borrowers entered the loan agreement. 21 Never-
theless, the courts could consider illegal actions under the Predatory
Lending Law under the unconscionability doctrine.' 22 Yet another court
solved the predatory lending crisis by placing a lender suitability test/
duty on lenders. In Mathurin v. Lost & Found Recovery, LLC,123 a New
York court specifically noted the subprime-mortgage crisis in holding
that "a lender underwriting a mortgage has a duty to investigate and
ascertain the economic status of the purchaser/mortgagor and whether
the purchaser/mortgagor may be committing a fraud against the seller in
the underlying transaction."'' 24 Many courts require that a party seeking
redress against predatory lending comply with procedural
technicalities. 
25
In response to the growing abundance of state predatory lending
acts, the federal government has sought to preempt these state laws. For
instance, as of 2004, the Officer of Comptroller of the Currency's regu-
lations bars states' predatory lending acts from applying to nationally-
chartered banks. As a result, arguably, state predatory lending acts apply
117. Id. at 559-60.
118. Id. at 560.
119. Id.
120. 625 S.E.2d 373, 376, 378 (W. Va. 2005).
121. Id. at 380.
122. Id.
123. 854 N.Y.S.2d 629 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
124. Id. at 631.
125. See, e.g., Jones v. Rosenberg, 940 A.2d 1109, 1120 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) ("[W]e are
not unaware of the issues that exist with respect to subprime mortgage lending, and that some
persons believe that current foreclosure procedures do not provide debtors with sufficient
opportunities to challenge foreclosure. Assuming, arguendo, that that belief has merit, a debtor
does not advance the debtor's cause by filing documents that do not comply with the Maryland
Rules, are incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading.").
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only to state-chartered banks.1 26
In summary, credit is essential to a thriving American economy,
fair credit terms are essential to creditor confidence and trust, and free-
dom from predation is essential to creditor confidence. Unfortunately,
while there have been some statutory and judicial efforts to redress pred-
atory lending, the law should consider a more protective approach to
predation. From all of the above, it is posited that, as credit is fundamen-
tal to the American economy, freedom from predation is a fundamental
constitutional issue.
III. MORAL CAPITALISM AND EMPATHY: RESUSCITATING THE
AMERICAN DREAM
"Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens."
' 127
Part III poses that the U.S. Constitution should recognize moral
capitalism, that is, a citizen's right to be protected against economic
oppression. Such a right shall hereinafter be referred to as the "freedom
from predation." Freedom from predation challenges the current dearth
of constitutional bases for such protection in subprime predatory lending
cases. It addresses the reality that, when courts deny citizens the exis-
tence of a constitutional right to protection from economic oppression,
they are consciously or unconsciously denying essential fairness and
promoting economic oppression.
What is this constitutional principle of moral capitalism? Simply,
and as stated in this Article's Introduction, it is a constitutionally-based
approach to protect citizens against discrimination on the basis of class.
As previously stated, moral capitalism is "the constitutional principle of
regulating capitalism to protect citizens from predation and to redress
economic exploitation due to one's class or economic condition."
What is the basis of moral capitalism? It is President Obama's con-
cept of empathy as applied to constitutional jurisprudence. It is based on
the fundamental right that every citizen has to be fairly treated in eco-
nomic matters and not be a victim or prey of predatory lending practices,
especially when dealing with large institutions. It introduces into consti-
126. Dietrich, supra note 91, at 195-96; see also Nicholas Bagley, The Unwarranted
Regulatory Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2274 (2004).
127. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally
CHARLES A. LOFOREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HIsTOPICAL INTERPRETATION (1987) (offering
a comprehensive perspective on the legal and social context of the Plessy case and its outcome);
LiNDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC AccORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN (1999)
(providing a thorough study of Justice Harlan and his judicial views); David S. Bogen, Why the
Supreme Court Lied in Plessy, 52 VILL. L. REV. 411 (2007) (criticizing the Court's true motives in
Plessy).
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tutional dialogue the ancient concept of equity, that of fundamental
fairness.
One application of moral capitalism follows from the Obama
Administration's response to the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 128 There, the Supreme Court denied
Lilly Ledbetter's claim for pay discrimination, due to a 180-day limit for
lodging such a complaint. 129 On the campaign trail, candidate Obama
often criticized the Supreme Court's Ledbetter decision.' 30 As one of his
first acts as President, Obama signed into legislation, the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009,11' negating the Court's time restriction for submit-
ting evidence of pay discrimination. Another statutory application of
moral capitalism is the Obama Administration's passage of the Credit
Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009.132 That
Act's goal is to level the playing field for credit card consumers and is a
clear example of President Obama's moral capitalism at work. To date,
the Obama Administration has brought moral capitalism to statutory
development; it is left to be seen how it will promote moral capitalism in
constitutional jurisprudence.
IV. MORAL CAPITALISM AND THE CASE FOR EXPANDING
CLASS-BASED SAFEGUARDS
"The quality of mercy is not strain'd,
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest:
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes."
Portia (impersonating an eminent judge), "The Merchant of
Venice." '133
Empathy, not unlike mercy in Shakespeare's play "The Merchant
of Venice," calls for kindness to those in distress. Part IV presents the
public-policy arguments for moral capitalism and the freedom from pre-
dation, particularly in the context of predatory, subprime mortgage lend-
ing. First, it argues that the present state of constitutional-rights' theory
fails to redress the unconscious institutional classism that citizens face
under the current state of the law and needs to develop a constitutional
128. 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5).
129. Id. at 628-29.
130. Slevin, supra note 38.
131. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
132. Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734.
133. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
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basis for redressing predation. 13 4 And second, it argues that as fairness is
a fundamental principle of American culture, as a matter of substantive
due process, predatory, subprime lending should be prohibited as a vio-
lation of constitutional law.
A. Current Constitutional-Rights' Theory Fails to Redress Predation
Economic freedom is a fundamental value.135 Credit is one of the
most essential features of economic freedom. 136 A constitutional analy-
sis of subprime mortgage lending demonstrates that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not
compel states to protect at-risk borrowers from predatory lending
abuses. Arguing in favor of moral capitalism under current constitutional
jurisprudence would be a difficult task.
1. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution provides, "No state shall.., deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"'"37 The Equal Protection
Clause can be seen as an attempt to secure the promise of the United
States' professed commitment to the proposition that "all men are cre-
ated equal" by empowering the judiciary to enforce that principle against
state abuses.' 38 In the wake of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states
could not, among other things, deprive people of the equal protection of
the laws. 39 The Equal Protection Clause has been applied most signifi-
cantly to protect the civil rights of African Americans. 4 °
134. Cf Crusto, Unconscious Classism, supra note 14 (using a parallel analysis to analyze the
constitutionality of disparate treatment of unincorporated sole proprietors).
135. Cf Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 21, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., I st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (guaranteeing right to work). But see W.
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1936).
136. See Georgina W. Kwan, Comment, Mortgagor Protection Laws: A Proposal for
Mortgage Foreclosure Reform in Hawai'i, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 245, 267 (2001).
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2000) (discussing the
Fourteenth Amendment in historical context); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1989) (providing details on the rationale for the Fourteenth
Amendment).
138. See generally BREST ET AL., supra note 137 (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment in
historical context).
139. See id. (discussing the expanding application of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect
civil rights through American history).
140. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the states'
maintenance of segregated educational facilities denied African-American children equal
protection); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that Texas's state system of law
schools, which educated blacks and whites at separate institutions, was unconstitutional); Smith v.
Allwight, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that the Democratic primary in Texas, in which voting
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In determining whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause,
the Supreme Court has applied three levels of scrutiny. Under strict scru-
tiny, a law is unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest. In addition, there cannot be a less
restrictive alternative available to the state to achieve that compelling
interest.141 Under immediate scrutiny, a law is unconstitutional unless it
is substantially related to an important governmental interest. 142 Finally,
under rational basis, a law is constitutional so long as it is reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental interest. 43
2. EQUAL PROTECTION AND COMMERCIAL REGULATIONS
Arguments for moral capitalism need to overcome the Supreme
Court's deference to state regulation of economic concerns. With regard
to state regulations of economic concerns, the Court is very deferential
to the states:
When local economic regulation is challenged solely as violat-
ing the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to leg-
islative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory
discriminations. Unless a classification trammels fundamental per-
sonal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as
race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality
of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classifica-
tion challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local econ-
omies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be
made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude. 
44
As a result, the Court has applied rational basis review to economic
issues. The Supreme Court has articulated the governing standard of
review as follows:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of
discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens dif-
ferently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if
the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achieve-
was restricted to whites alone, was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds); Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that a state's offering a legal education to whites
but not to blacks violated the Equal Protection Clause); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927)
(holding that the denial of the right to vote based on race was unconstitutional); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding that the exclusion of blacks from juries was a denial of
equal protection to black defendants).
141. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S.
432 (1943); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
142. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301-02 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
143. See id.
144. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
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ment of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in prac-
tice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it. 145
3. EQUAL PROTECTION AND PREDATION
Working against equal protection relative to economic oppression
in the form of predatory lending is the argument that creditors ought to
charge low income and unqualified middle income borrowers a higher
interest rate because those borrowers represent a greater risk of loss.
From the vantage point of lenders, at-risk borrowers are fortunate to
have loans made to them on any terms, even high rate ones. This view-
point is reflected in commentary that blames predatory subprime lending
prey for the current national recession, as if the victims were ultimately
responsive for their inability to pay on exorbitant interest rate loans. 4 6 Is
it possible that although it is legal to charge the less fortunate higher
interest rates, that such a practice is a violation of equal protection?
One might argue that legislation that allows higher, arguably preda-
tory, mortgage lending terms to be charged to the certain Middle Class
and Under-Privileged borrowers is class legislation, and is class discrim-
ination. Facing a similar argument relative to the law's unequal treat-
ment of sole proprietors and partners compared to that of corporations
and corporate officers, one California Court of Appeals stated:
[There is no] merit in the remaining contention that different
statutory treatment of "sole proprietors or partners" on the one hand,
and corporations and corporate officers on the other, is "class legisla-
tion" and a denial of "equal protection." Treatment of corporations as
a distinct class has received widespread constitutional sanction....
"The equality guaranteed by the equal protection clause is equality
under the same conditions, and among persons similarly situated. The
Legislature may make a reasonable classification of persons and busi-
nesses and other activities and pass special legislation applying to
certain classes. The classification must not be arbitrary, but must be
based upon some difference in the classes having a substantial rela-
tion to a legitimate object to be accomplished."' 47
As a result, as of now, only heightened scrutiny would circumvent
145. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
146. See, e.g., Geoff Colvin, A Return to Thrift, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2008, at D3 ("Blaming
subprime lenders has become popular, and in some cases they were deceptive, but most borrowers
knew perfectly well what they could afford. Millions joined in the debt mania, and now we're
paying the price.").
147. Topps & Trowsers v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. Rptr. 60, 61 (Ct. App. 1973) (citation
omitted).
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the Court's deferential treatment of state economic regulatory concerns
under rational basis review. To employ heightened scrutiny, the Court
must find either that predatory lending prey constitutes a suspect classi-
fication 14 8 or that the differing treatment of certain Middle Class and
Under-Privileged borrowers infringes upon their fundamental rights.14 9
4. PREY AS A SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION
On the surface, subprime mortgage lending prey are not entitled to
constitutional protection as a suspect class. Suspect classes typically
have a "'history of purposeful unequal treatment' or [have] been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics
not truly indicative of their abilities." 5' An alleged disadvantaged class
of individuals who choose to borrow mortgage loans with predatory
terms is not obviously a "suspect" class.
But beneath the surface of this analysis one would discover that
subprime lending mortgage prey are often representative of suspect
classes, groups who have been historically discriminated against and
have exhibited "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics
that define them as a discrete group." 5 ' Take, for example, the case of
African-American, subprime mortgage lending prey. As the Supreme
Court considers "African Americans" to be a suspect class, if they were
to sue the state alleging they were discriminated against because they are
African Americans, then the class is obviously suspect. However, if
instead they were to argue that state law discriminates against them
purely because they are subprime mortgage lending prey, then the class
is obviously not suspect. An argument positing that the state discrimi-
nates against them because they are both African-American and sub-
prime mortgage lending prey would trigger heightened scrutiny because
they are African Americans.
The Supreme Court seems reluctant to expand what constitutes sus-
pect classes. For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, the Court established criteria for determining suspect classifica-
tions, when grappling with the question of whether mental retardation
should be a suspect class, after a group home for the mentally retarded
148. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (holding
that mental retardation is not a suspect classification "calling for a more exacting standard of
judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation").
149. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that
conditioning the right to vote on the payment of a tax violated the Equal Protection Clause).
150. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
151. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987).
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was denied a special permit in Texas. 152 The Court considered four fac-
tors before concluding that the mentally retarded were not a suspect
class: (1) whether there is a history of "continuing antipathy and
prejudice" against the group; (2) whether the group is "politically pow-
erless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of
lawmakers"; (3) whether the group is defined by an "immutable" charac-
teristic; and (4) whether that characteristic is one that is generally irrele-
vant.153 Despite a finding that mental retardation satisfied the first and
the third factors, the Cleburne Court denied suspect classification.
5 4
This analysis suggests that each factor must be fulfilled to warrant
heightened scrutiny, which is more probing than rational basis review.
Relative to poverty, the Supreme Court has failed to find that pov-
erty is the basis for suspect classification. 55 States have promulgated
laws that allow for predatory lending practices, including allowing for
higher interest rate charges to certain Middle Class and Under-Privi-
leged prey in all lending areas, mortgages and pay-day loans. Contrary
to current law, charging different citizen classes different loan interest
rates is inherently discriminatory and unequal. Accordingly, because the
Equal Protection Clause provides that no state can deny any person
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws, it follows that the
subprime mortgage lending prey should also be afforded the same treat-
ment as regular borrowers. In addition, it might be argued that certain
Middle Class and Under-Privileged borrowers should be granted suspect
classification. Employing the four pronged test outlined by the Supreme
Court in City of Cleburne, one would need to successfully argue that 1)
there is a history of continued antipathy and prejudice against those
impoverished (certain Middle Class and Under-Privileged citizens); 2)
that impoverished people are politically powerless in the sense that they
have no ability to attract the attention of lawmakers; 3) that impover-
ished people are defined by an immutable characteristic; and 4) that
impoverishment is a characteristic that is generally irrelevant.
5. EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO FACIALLY-
NEUTRAL STATE STATUTES
If a suspect class of prey were to challenge the constitutionality of a
state statute that discriminates between subprime borrowers and prime
borrowers, they would face additional challenges to trigger heightened
scrutiny. Presumably, the state statute would be facially neutral, mean-
152. See 473 U.S. at 442-46.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 446-47.
155. See NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 492 (3d ed. 2005).
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ing the statutory language has no express mention of the suspect class.
Hence, to succeed, the claim would need to allege that the facially-
neutral law has a disparate impact among members of the suspect class
and that discrimination against this class was the intent and purpose of
the state act. 156 Middle Class and/or Under-Privileged borrowers to be a
suspect class would add class discrimination to race and gender discrim-
ination for constitutional consideration.
Not all regulations are equal. A legislature can present legitimate
reasons for legislative acts that may disadvantage street vendors over
store front merchants or for why the length of a cargo train should be
less than twenty-four cars. But a legislature's arbitrary denial by default
of equal treatment of borrowers indiscriminate of real risk can hardly be
said to have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. In addi-
tion, another argument in favor of freedom from predation is that the
legislative failure to grant such a right to subprime mortgage borrowers
disadvantages homeowners in underserved, suspect-class communities
far more frequently, and may rise to support an argument for disparate
impact, although it may be difficult to prove discriminatory, intent.
6. THE FREEDOM FROM PREDATION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Perhaps subprime borrowers can successfully argue that the free-
dom from predation is a fundamental constitutional right as a denegation
of the right to the pursuit of happiness. A fundamental right, as defined
by the U.S. Supreme Court, is "akin to free speech or marriage or to
those other rights ... that the Court has come to regard as fundamental
and that demand the lofty requirement of a compelling governmental
interest before they may be significantly regulated."' 157 While it is diffi-
cult to imagine how subprime borrowing status might rise to a funda-
mental right, as the following analysis demonstrates, failing to provide
subprime mortgage prey protection from predation by default and under
operation of the rules and principles of the common law is inherently
unfair and discriminatory in comparison to the law's treatment of other
investors, namely, purchasers of securities. This is because the threats to
the subprime mortgage prey are virtually identical to those facing other
security investors. The securities laws embrace as an essential principle
the concept of suitability, that in selling a security to an investor, the
stockbroker must consider whether the investment is suitable to an
investor's risk tolerance and financial needs. There is no doubt that the
156. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (upholding a police department's use
of a written personnel test, even though it had a disproportionate impact on black applicants,
because such impact alone could not infer a discriminatory intent on the part of the state).
157. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973).
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reason why a homeowner chooses to buy rather than rent is ultimately an
investment decision. As a result, a mortgage provider must consider the
suitability of the mortgage and the risk tolerance of the borrower. Sim-
ply, mortgage borrowers should be treated the same way as security
investors; they should not be sold mortgage products that they ultimately
cannot afford.
An additional constitutionally-based argument in favor of granting
subprime mortgage prey protection against predation might be made
under the Dormant Commerce Clause. If it could be established that the
lack of protection against predation unduly burdens interstate commerce,
then differing treatment of the two groups of securities investors, tradi-
tional securities investors and mortgage borrowers, would be
unconstitutional.
For the all the above reasons, an equal protection claim supporting
the freedom from predation would not likely pass current judicial
scrutiny.
7. FINAL WORD ON CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
While courts are generally deferential to economic regulations
under rational basis review, state laws motivated by irrational beliefs,
antiquated values, or stereotypic notions of class attributes may still be
suspect under rational basis review. The lynchpin of the argument favor-
ing the freedom from predation is that the current state of the law
reflects antiquated notions of securities investors. Nowadays, subprime
mortgage borrowers are just as deserving of securities law protection,
including the suitability rule, as any other investor class. Evidence of
this fact is the proliferation of investment vehicles targeted at the sub-
prime market.
Some might argue that the Constitution is not and should not be
concerned with economic equality. This position is contrary to case law;
there are many areas of economic concern wherein the U.S. Supreme
Court has found constitutional interests. Some of these include limita-
tions on punitive damages, 5 8 limitations on the federal income tax,'
59
and the constitutionality of New Deal legislation, 60 such as social secur-
ity, to name a few. Hence, it cannot be argued that the freedom from
predation is outside the purview of the U.S. Supreme Court merely
because it relates to economic matters. If such an absurd argument were
true, much of the Court's most important decisions would be negated.
158. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
159. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
160. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
338 (1935).
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B. As Fairness Is a Fundamental Principle of American Culture,
Predatory, Subprime Lending Should Be Prohibited as a
Matter of Substantive Due Process
It could be argued that as fairness is a fundamental principle of
American culture, that the freedom from predation is fundamental as
predation is inherently unfair. It is instructive to analyze the freedom
from predation in comparison to the right to intrastate travel, arguably a
fundamental right that has yet to receive U.S. Supreme Court recogni-
tion. In a thoughtful analysis of the constitutionality of intrastate
travel,'61 the Third Circuit in Lutz v. City of New York examined six
possible constitutional sources for the right and concluded that "no con-
stitutional text other than the Due Process Clause could possibly create a
right of localized intrastate movement." '62 The Third Circuit cited Jus-
tice Scalia's narrow test of substantive due process, which states, "[T]he
Due Process Clause substantively protects unenumerated rights 'so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.' .. . [T]he relevant traditions must be identified and evalu-
ated at the most specific level of generality possible."'' 63 In Lutz, the
Third Circuit concluded that the right to move freely was "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" and "deeply rooted in the Nation's
history." 1
64
Using Justice Scalia's standard, is fair dealing and protection
against economic oppression so deeply rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people to be ranked as fundamental? It would appear so,
for as Professor Ronald Dworkin has stated, a moral reading of the Con-
stitution proposes that we interpret constitutional "clauses on the under-
standing that they invoke moral principles about political decency and
justice."' 165 While to date, the U.S. Supreme Court has not found wealth
or class as a suspect class, perhaps President Obama's empathy criteria
for selection of U.S. Supreme Court Justices and Obama's moral capital-
ism will result in new inroads for the freedom from predation and for
protection against economic oppression for the Middle Class and the
Under-Privileged.
161. See Crusto, Enslaved Constitution, supra note 14.
162. 899 F.2d 255, 267 (3d Cir. 1999).
163. Id. at 268 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality
opinion)).
164. Id.
165. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUrION 2 (1996).
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V. EMPATHY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE FREEDOM
FROM PREDATION
In conclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly found that
there exists a general right to be protected against economic oppression
such as in the form of predation. As a result, a citizen has no constitu-
tional protection against economic oppression, often resulting from
unconscious institutional classism. Furthermore, with economic oppres-
sion comes consumer distrust of financial markets, foreclosures, bank-
ruptcies, and an unhealthy economy. In addition, protection against
economic oppression might help address wealth inequity that exists in
America. Hopefully, moral capitalism will assist the vast number of
Americans who face significant unmet civil legal matters annually.
Consistent with President Obama's call for empathy in judicial
jurisprudence, this Article concludes that constitutional theory should be
expanded so as to provide constitutional protection against predatory
lending and other forms of economic oppression. The freedom from pre-
dation promotes inherent fairness and ensures the continued growth and
protection of consumer markets. Consistent with President Obama's call
for empathy, the strongest argument in support of the freedom against
predation is substantive due process. According to Justice Scalia, in
determining whether a right meets the substantive due process test, that
right must be "so deeply rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental." '166
When it comes to fundamental fairness and freedom from eco-
nomic oppression, moral capitalism and the freedom from predation
represent what is the best of America: life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. Predation is economic tyranny and a form of enslavement. In
developing a human-rights' Constitution, the Obama Administration
should embrace change in the form of the freedom from predation. This
is Obama's moral capitalism, an empathic plan to resuscitate the Ameri-
can Dream.
166. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 (plurality opinion) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (Cardozo, J.)).
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